![]() ![]() ![]() He sees Sherman as more concerned with the geographical objective of capturing Atlanta than the military goal of smashing the Confederate army, lacking Grant’s understanding that the principal object of war is to conquer and destroy the enemy’s armed forces. Fuller on Grant and Basil Liddell Hart on Sherman-but his assessments were so unorthodox that even with the endorsement of preeminent Civil War historian Douglas Southall Freeman, his book received scant attention in its day. ![]() Burne assesses the military leadership of Grant, Lee, Sherman, Hood, Johnston, Early, and Sheridan from mid-1864 to Appomattox, contradicting prevailing perceptions of the generals and even proposing that Grant’s military capabilities were inferior to Lee’s.īurne sought to challenge the orthodox views of other historians-J. Out of print for more than fifty years, Lee, Grant and Sherman is an unrecognized classic of Civil War history that presaged current scholarship by decades. Many might be startled to learn that a British army officer also called these opinions into question long ago. Had Lee enjoyed the manpower or materiel advantages of Grant, would the South have triumphed? Had Hood possessed strength superior to Sherman’s, would he still have lost their encounters in Georgia? Popular sentiment has long bowed to the military leadership of the Civil War’s victorious generals-a view that has been disputed by modern scholarship. ![]()
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